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Abstract: Innovative ways to manage the urban water cycle are required to deal with an ageing
drinking and waste water infrastructure and new societal imperatives. This paper examines the
influence of water governance in enabling transformations and technological innovation uptake
in urban water management. A governance assessment framework is developed and applied in
three case-studies, examining different scales and types of innovations used to tackle challenges
in European urban water management. The methodology combines documentary analysis and
interviews to reconstruct historical storylines of the shift in the water governance of urban water
management for each site. The research provides detailed empirical observations on the factors
conducive to innovation uptake at the local level. Critical governance factors such as commitment to
compromise, the necessity to build political support, and the role of “entrepreneurs” and coalitions
are highlighted. The paper also explores the role of discursive strategies and partnership design,
as well as that of regulative, economic and communicative instruments, in creating barriers and
opportunities to initiate and secure change. A number of recommendations targeted at innovators
and water managers are presented in the conclusion.
Keywords: transitions; cities; sustainability; adaptation; water governance
1. Introduction
The water sector is a crucial part of modern economies supporting the delivery of safe drinking
water and sanitation services to society. During the 20th century, the water sector has undergone
significant transformations, moving from unstructured systems to a gradual but vast expansion
of water pipes, sewers, wastewater treatment, and storm-water infrastructure. With an ageing
infrastructure and new societal demands, the sector needs to undergo a new wave of transformations
and innovation uptake towards greater environmental and financial sustainability [1–3].
Improving the sustainability of urban water management systems has been the focus of much
recent academic work, spanning from practitioner-oriented papers [4,5] to theoretically grounded
analyses of societal transformations [2]. A major barrier to change in urban water management
mentioned in the literature relates to the characteristics of existing urban water management
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technologies (i.e., centralised, large-scale, capital-intensive, durable). These barriers are compounded
by governance factors arising from existing social and political institutions and dominant values
and beliefs [4,6,7]. Despite the fact that some important progress has been made, particularly in the
Australian context [8], the influence of governance on the uptake of technological innovations in urban
water management is still not understood as well as technical or economic factors.
This study examines governance factors influencing technological innovation uptake in the
European context and on a range of water issues (i.e., water and ecological quality, water scarcity).
Drawing on the work of [9], it applies a governance assessment framework to three European
case-studies (Aarhus, Denmark; Emscher, Germany; Zaragoza, Spain) to examine governance factors
conducive to the uptake of “innovations” in urban water management. Innovations are here understood
as new technologies, concrete measures, and products or tools that are introduced to improve the
sustainability of local urban water infrastructures.
The contributions of this paper are at least threefold. First, it develops and applies a theoretical
framework for understanding the governance of urban water management. Second, it provides
additional empirical observations on the factors conducive to change processes in urban water
management at the local level. More broadly, it sheds light on the societal and organisational
factors at play in transformations of social–ecological systems. Third, it derives recommendations for
supporting sustainable changes in urban water management. Building on a comparative analysis of
three case-studies with different cultural and environmental contexts, these recommendations may
apply to a broader range of contexts.
Section 2 presents an overview of the assessment framework and the methods used for data
collection and analysis. Section 3 presents the storylines of innovation uptake in the three case-studies.
Section 4 discusses these empirical results against the assessment framework, while the conclusions,
Section 5 provide a synthesis and some recommendations.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. The Governance Assessment Framework
This study builds on the governance assessment framework of Bressers et al. [9] which provides
a coherent theoretical basis for analysis of governance in European environmental policy regimes.
Whereas the original framework was developed in the context of water scarcity and drought, this study
adapts and sizes it for analysing innovation uptake in urban water management. The assessment
framework is built around five dimensions. At different hydrological scales and administrative levels
(dimension 1), social actors and their networks are involved in innovation uptake (dimension 2).
Different perceptions of the problems and ambitions in addressing them (dimension 3) are brought
to the table by different actors; these goals represent different facets of the challenge at hand.
Strategies and instruments are used to advance and realize these multiple goals (dimension 4),
drawing on the resources and responsibilities of the involved actors (dimension 5). In other words,
governance is seen as the context in which innovation uptake occurs. Innovation uptake is the result
of the interactions of people (both individuals and organizations or groups), influenced by specific
socio-cultural, political, economic and environmental circumstances [9]. The dimensions are described
in more detail below with regards to urban water management.
The urban water cycle is constituted by water bodies (e.g., rivers, lakes, groundwater bodies),
artificial structures (e.g., pipes, drains, tanks, gutters, reservoirs) and urban land (e.g., houses, pavements,
gardens, parks). In addition, whole catchments and river basins, including upstream rural land,
are increasingly taken into account in urban water planning (e.g., flood risk management, water quality
improvements). Given the multiplicity of elements in the urban water cycle, multiple social levels are
in play. The lowest level is mostly characterised by policies and activities such as water pricing or
spatial planning, carried out by water companies and local authorities and acting on households,
businesses and other local users. Regional and state or federal levels are dominated by the regulative
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activities of governments targeted at water companies and local authorities; while, in Europe,
the international level mostly relates to the regulative activities of European institutions and the
influence of international markets.
A wide range of actors may influence innovation uptake in urban water management.
Butterworth and Morris [10] identified: (i) those taking and effecting decisions (service providers,
regulatory agencies, planners); (ii) those closely influencing decision-making (e.g., civil society,
water users, professional associations, unions); (iii) those providing research and advisory activities
(e.g., academia, consulting); (iv) the media; and (v) financial institutions. Several authors [7,10,11]
note that individual change agents, or so-called “policy entrepreneurs”, often play important roles in
creating and maintaining a momentum for change.
Better communication and exchange between relevant actors can contribute to enhancing
innovation uptake, as can more collaboration and inclusive decision-making. Projects in Europe
and Australia have explored the role of participatory mechanisms as an avenue for innovation uptake.
For example, “learning alliances” or “shadow networks” aim to enhance exchange of knowledge and
practices [12]. However, while some studies suggest that increased participation has led to system
transformation and innovation uptake [13,14], other studies remain more critical [5].
In the literature, the views, interests and goals of involved actors regarding the risks involved in
changing urban water management are often presented as major factors influencing innovation uptake.
Many authors highlight, for instance, that potential users of innovations do not necessarily select
the most sustainable solution, but rather the most satisfactory one, influenced by such variables as
loyalty, habits and cost of change [3,15]. The water sector is generally considered risk-adverse because
of the twin threat of large financial losses in case of failure (due to capital-intensive investments) and
strict user demand and needs (e.g., public health, regulatory standards). Water managers may thus be
unwilling or reluctant to take risks by introducing an innovation in a system where it is difficult to
predict impacts and understand trade-offs.
The literature places great emphasis on the role of strategies, regulations and other institutional
instruments for facilitating innovation uptake [10]. The European Innovation Partnership (EIP) on
water [16], for example, highlights that the current standard of public procurements can give preference
to the lowest cost and proven technologies. Marlow et al. [3] observe that pricing policies based on high
standing charges (as most frequently applied at present) do not give incentives to reduce consumption
and adopt water efficient technologies by end-users. Innovation uptake can also be limited because
innovations may challenge established financial models. For example, reducing water consumption
may jeopardise the cost recovery strategies of water utilities [3]. In addition, many researchers
acknowledge the lack of incentives to account for externalities (such as resource depletion or pollution
due to wastewater) [5]. While government funds typically are used to support investment in the water
sector, no mechanism exists to integrate multiple benefits and non-monetary values. Policies providing
investment security in the long term, setting appropriate tariffs and investment cycles, or establishing
alternative public and private financial models can help overcome these barriers [13].
Urban water management is characterised by a high dependence on financial resources available
upfront (to cover capital costs), and their distribution amongst (public and private) actors engaged in
urban water management. In addition, there is limited capacity to recover costs through pricing, due to
the perception that water is a public good and should therefore be free or at least easily affordable.
Overall, this can limit interest in risky initiatives such as innovation uptake. Careful design of the
distribution of legal responsibilities is required to facilitate investment for and maintenance and
development of water infrastructure. At the same time, other resources (than financial) are required,
in particular knowledge and expertise. The uptake of innovation can be encouraged by continuously
improving the understanding of the system being managed through knowledge gathering [3].
In parallel, cultural change in practitioners’ behaviour is considered necessary, moving towards
more openness for emerging and multi-disciplinary approaches [5]. This may occur through education
and training, and may therefore take several years to be felt in practice. Previous research has also
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emphasized the need to navigate and/or adapt to cultural and social barriers to ensure the backing of
the public [17,18].
2.2. The Assessment Template
Based on the above theoretical background and elaborating on the reference questions in the
governance assessment framework of Bressers et al. [9], this study developed a series of questions to
assess the innovation uptake in urban water management in the form of an “assessment template”.
The questions were elaborated to direct the collection of personal motivations, experiences and
perceptions of key informants involved in the innovation uptake. Table 1 presents a sample of the
questions that were applied to all three case-studies which experienced some significant change in
their local urban water management system.
Table 1. Questions of the assessment framework for innovation uptake in urban water management.
Dimensions Assessment Questions
Levels and scales
What administrative levels were relevant for innovation uptake? Which hydrological scales
did they relate to?
Were important administrative levels missing?
Were there conflicts or synergies between administrative levels?
Actors and
networks
Which actors were involved (or not) in the uptake of the innovation? Was it possible for new
actors to be included in the relevant fora?
What forms of dialogue existed between actors? Were they informal or institutionalised?
Were there actors with a mediating role?
Was there a strong influence from actors and/or coalitions?
Goals and
ambitions
Which various angles did the debate on the uptake of the innovation take?
To what extent did views support each other, and to what extent were they in competition?
To what extent did one/several perspective(s) dominate the process of innovation uptake?
How, if at all, were actors encouraged to re-assess their own perspectives? Were compromises
made in the process of innovation uptake?
Did new knowledge of the system play a role in making the case for innovation uptake?
What types of evaluations were done?
Strategies and
instruments
Which strategies and policy instruments were relevant for the innovation uptake?
Were there any synergies and/or conflicts between strategies and instruments?
Could policies and instruments be adjusted to support innovation uptake?
Responsibilities
and resources
What were the mandates of the different actors that are of relevance for the innovation uptake?
What technical, financial, knowledge, social, cultural resources were used to encourage
innovation uptake?
Were mandates strong enough to enable innovation uptake? Were enough resources allocated
to enable innovation uptake?
Could roles, responsibilities and resources be adjusted to support innovation uptake?
In particular, did capacity-building play a role in innovation uptake?
2.3. Data Collection
The case-studies were located in different national contexts (Figure 1) and contrasted in terms
of challenges tackled. The Aarhus case-study was focused on improving river aesthetics and water
quality issues; one main aim was to allow bathing in the city’s harbour. The case related to the
Emscher catchment focused on multiple objectives concerning water quality, river restoration, and flood
management. The Zaragoza case-study aimed at managing water demand and reducing water leakage,
with the ulterior aim of avoiding new water infrastructure and transfers. The case-studies included
contrasting innovations: advanced monitoring and warning systems for water quality in Aarhus,
storm retention basins in Emscher, and water saving devices and leakage control in Zaragoza.
In all cases, the data were collected in two steps. First, the research questions of the assessment
framework were addressed through document studies. A total of 50 documents were considered,
including laws and policies, administrative and research reports, stakeholder publications, and other
relevant documents.
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Next, an interview campaign was carried out, to validate documentary findings and fill information
gaps. A total of 19 interviews with actors who played an active role in the innovation uptake were
carried out across the three sites (Table 2), including: (i) public authorities (e.g., municipalities);
(ii) semi-public organizations (e.g., drinking water and wastewater companies); (iii) private organizations
(e.g., construction sector); (iv) civil society (e.g., environmental and civil rights Non-Governmental
Organisations); (v) the academic sector. The type of social actor interviewed depended on the case-study
investigated and the information needed. However, in each case-study, an effort was made to select
a range of interviewees both within and outside the core groups of actors driving the innovation
uptake, in order to ensure the inclusion of different perspectives in the analysis.Water 2016, 8, 477 5 of 15 
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Table 2. Overview of interviews performed in the case-studies.
Case-Study Public Semi Public Private Civil Society Academic Total
Aarhus 3 2 2 – – 7
Emscher 2 1 1 1 – 5
Zaragoza 3 1 – 1 2 7
Total 7 5 3 2 2 19
An interview guide with a set of open-ended questions related to the dimensions in the assessment
framework was applied. The interviews were conducted on an individual basis. They lasted around
one hour and were semi-structured, to allow interviewees to bring in new perspectives and ideas.
2.4. Data Analysis
The dat w re first reported against th res arch questions of the ass ssment framework.
Patterns of agreements and disagreements between interviewees, and between interview answers
and documentary information, were analysed qualitatively, to gain a more nuanced understanding
of the context, perspectives and interests involved. Storylines highlighting key processes and factors
influencing innovation uptake were subsequently developed. The production of these storylines
serves as detailed reporti of the proc s es that led to the innovation uptake, llowing an in-depth
understanding of enabling factors and barriers. Presenting innovation uptake chronologically allows
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for a “thick” understanding, avoiding the simplification and over-reductionist approach of much
research in environmental management [19]. Storylines were first structured around a timeline of
the innovation uptake. Key factors identified through the assessment framework were then matched
against key events and processes on this timeline. Section 3 presents the storylines.
Answers for each question of the assessment framework were then compared between case-studies.
Main commonalities and differences were noted and contrasted in order to identify relationships
between governance factors and innovation uptake. Thematic groups and issues were examined
through the five dimensions of the governance assessment framework. These results are discussed in
Section 4.
3. Results
The next three sub-sections present storylines of innovation uptake in each case study. Figure 2
presents a timeline of key events in each case study.
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3.1. Aarhus Case-Study
Aarhus is a coastal city of about 311,000 people, located in the eastern part of mainland Denmark.
Historically a centre for the food-processing industry, the town is transitioning from a period of
decline to become a centre for research and manufacturing of clean energy technologies. Aarhus River,
was culverted around 1930 for hygienic and urban planning purposes, but started to reopen from
1989. The city has since made considerable investments in environmental planning. Water-related
recreational elements are being developed to enhance the quality of life in the city centre, the old
harbour area, and the upstream Lake Brabrand. The focus of the case-study is on the uptake of
a real-time monitoring and warning system for bathing water quality, which was part of a larger
scheme to improve water quality in the Aarhus river and the receiving waters.
The innovation uptake in the Aarhus case can be seen as largely locally driven. The 1990s was
a period with increasing focus on urban planning and development in Aarhus. The city adopted the
ambition to become a “Green City”. Most local actors attribute the start of the Aarhus River project
to a vision and initiative by a local politician in the early 2000s. According to the interviews, he was
looking for a popular cause that might strengthen his position for an upcoming election, and to this
end, he promised his voters that he would bring back the once bustling life in the city centre by
restoring and cleaning up a section of the river.
Around the same time, the municipality had to turn down an application to establish
a kayak-rental on the river due to poor water quality. Others pointed to the recently completed
harbour restoration in Copenhagen, arguing that Aarhus should also develop its old harbour area,
including residential, recreational and bathing areas. The concept of improving life in the city by
improving the river water quality received a lot of media attention, which resulted in broad popular
support for the intervention. Thus, local opinion leaders played an important role in the initial stages,
and there was also an element of imitating the capital.
Opinion leaders did not, however, operate in isolation. Water experts in the municipality
and technology-providing companies were pushing for an innovative water management solution.
Existing local expert networks were, in this sense, quite decisive for the success of the process. A core
group of four to six experts, they had developed a high level of mutual trust and a willingness to take on
risks. A number of factors explain this. Firstly, Aarhus is a relatively small city, where people working
in the same sector easily get to know each other and often are connected through multiple ties. Secondly,
all the main actors had local offices in Aarhus, making it easy to meet face-to-face. Thirdly, there was
a high level of personnel mobility: lead persons in the municipality had careers spanning across several
of the involved organizations, with close insights into what the various actors could and could not
deliver. Likewise, individuals on the side of the private companies had worked for the municipality
before. Last but not least, there was a tradition for informal, direct person-to-person communication.
By 2005, the city council of Aarhus decided formally to embark on a project to improve the
hygienic water quality in Lake Brabrand, Aarhus River and the harbour. With a view to the EU Water
Framework Directive (WFD), hydrological characteristics of the system and patterns of recreational
use, the political vision was extended to include a larger geography, and climate change adaptation
was included as an important aspect. Attracting funding was not an issue. Linking climate change
adaptation to the already broad array of issues involved—environment conservation, recreation,
green business, urban development, increasing the city’s attractiveness to tax payers as well as tourists,
harbour restoration—was a further enabling factor.
By 2006, an initial proposal including combined sewer overflow retention basins,
enhanced wastewater treatment, and a real-time control system to coordinate releases from the
retention basins was presented to the city council. The series of retention basins was linked with
the interest in developing a more adaptive solution in the context of climate change adaptation.
The solution also included a bathing water quality warning system, motivated by the EU Bathing
Water Directive. The warning system was estimated to save 25 million EUR in infrastructure costs
that otherwise would be required to reduce the frequency of non-compliant events. In other words,
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economic arguments played a strong role in the discussions. Another point noted by several
interviewees was technological ambition in the core group of experts. They wanted Aarhus to
be a frontrunner in water management technology. Public hearings and the media were used to
communicate with the public during the decision process. The project to implement the real-time
monitoring and warning systems was brought forward following a feasibility study and the realisation
that costs could be covered through local sources, in the form of a small, gradual increase in water
tariffs–2 DKK, or around 0.27 EUR, per cubic water.
Project implementation was organized as a partnering contract between the municipality and
technology-providing companies. Partnering rather than sub-contracting had the effect that experts in
the municipality and the technology providers shared responsibility for the results and were sitting
side by side to do the coding, etc. Thus, they developed a common project culture, with inherent
capacity building. The partnering contracts were also seen as more flexible, allowing for adjustment
of roles and responsibilities to meet technological and process challenges. According to Aarhus
municipality and the water utility, the form of contract was a conscious strategy, crucial to achieving
the technological results and building ownership in the receiving organization. In their view, as well
as that of several other stakeholders, the use of partnering contracts was an important enabling factor.
Another enabler was the willingness to take risks—apparent in the limited concern with economic
assessments—and a willingness to enter partnering contracts, as well as the readiness to implement
a novel solution. This was presented by interviewees as a feature of the management culture and
general mindset in Aarhus municipality at the time. Near the completion of the project, communicative
events, such as guided tours and concerts in the newly built, though not yet functional, retention tanks,
were organized
3.2. The Emscher Case-Study
The Emscher is, originally, a 109 km long river flowing through the Ruhr Area, the most densely
populated area in Europe, located in the west of Germany. In the 19th century, the river’s recurrent
floods, together with a rapidly growing wastewater discharge, became a growing problem for the
newly-built urban and industrial areas. The Emscher was thus straightened, with its original length
reduced to 85 km (the so-called first Emscher conversion). The second Emscher conversion was initiated
in the 1990s with the aim to disconnect wastewater and river water by conducting the wastewater in
underground wastewater sewers to wastewater treatment plants, and to re-convert the river and its
tributaries into natural waterways.
The focus of the case-study is the creation of Lake Phoenix, a project linked to the Master Plan
Emscher Future, a regional commitment by the cities of the Ruhr Area for the restoration of the
Emscher, including such measures as the construction of combined sewer overflow structures and
restored waterways. The start of the Master Plan Emscher Future can be traced to the international
Architecture Exhibition, which took place at the end of the 1980s and gave enormous impulse and new
values to the region. The Master Plan Emscher Future itself was developed by Emschergenossenschaft
(EG), a regional catchment water association. A first draft was signed by the representatives of the
Emscher cities in 2005.
Lake Phoenix represents a typical subproject of the Master Plan, involving joint responsibility
between EG and the respective municipality (Dortmund). Until 2001, a large steel production company
was located where Lake Phoenix is situated today, while the Emscher river flowed in an underground
channel underneath the industrial area. Signs of the coming end of steel works emerged during the
1990s, leading to the initial discussions on how to develop the area. Transforming the area into a lake
was at first not considered as feasible given the huge scale of the project. However, a few committed
individual actors were willing to take risks and were able to bring the project forward.
A crucial factor for the successful realization of Lake Phoenix was the successful linking of various
problems and ambitions. The lake was thus designed to serve as a biodiversity hotspot, as a flood
retention basin, and as a place for local recreation and sports. Most significantly, it had the potential to
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make the city more attractive for people and businesses by upgrading an under-privileged district.
Interviewees stressed that achieving multiple objectives required compromising, for example between
ecological objectives (i.e., size of the lake and natural areas) and economic ones (i.e., land available
for real estate development). As a result of a common will to succeed and a number of group and
bilateral meetings between key stakeholders, these compromises could be reached. Interviewees also
highlighted that the actors’ good relations and belief in the project helped find solutions, just as it
helped to settle discussions concerning upcoming additional costs and risks. The (historical) role
and position of EG as a mediator was important in this respect. The realisation of Lake Phoenix was
furthermore facilitated by favourable timing, being that the Emscher conversion coincided with the
abandonment of the brownfield site. The obligations and environmental objectives resulting from the
implementation of the Water Framework Directive can also be seen as an important facilitating factor.
The Phoenix-See Entwicklungsgesellschaft was founded as a subsidiary of the municipal utility
company to manage this large-scale project, an external project leader was employed, and expert
engineering offices were contracted. A clear division of tasks, responsibilities and expertise was
highlighted by many interviewees as critical success factors. Parallel public engagement activities
were exploited such as the Emscher Dialog, a public forum held by EG every 1 or 2 years since 2001.
Further feasibility and assessment studies were conducted to improve the solution and convince
decision makers that the risks involved were acceptable. After a long technical planning phase,
digging operations started in 2006. In 2009 the new stream bed of the upper waters of the Emscher
was completed and the selling of land properties surrounding the future lake began. In 2010 the lake
was flooded and officially opened in 2011. House building along the lake started in this period.
The marketing of the real estate was a financial aspect considered from the beginning in order to
make the project partly self-supporting. In addition, thanks to the lake’s multi-purpose, funding could
be organised from various parties and domains (water management–EG; ecology-Ökologieprogramm
im Emscher-Lippe-Raum by the federal state of NRW; urban development). For example, EG used
existing sources of funding budgeted for the construction of a flood retention basin.
3.3. The Zaragoza Case-Study
Zaragoza is situated in the centre of the Ebro basin in the north of Spain, along the Pyrenees. In the
mid-1990s, Zaragoza, and other cities of Spain, faced water shortages. Traditionally, seasonal water
scarcity was dealt with by the building of reservoirs and water transfers. However, a significant
change in Zaragoza policy towards a demand management approach, focused on reducing water
consumption and increasing water use efficiency, occurred in the late 1990s. A series of technical
innovations were implemented, such as user level uptake of water saving technologies, leakage control
technologies (including rehabilitating pipeline networks, pressure management controls, and District
Metered Areas). As a result, Zaragoza freshwater withdrawal was reduced significantly, and per capita
domestic water consumed was reduced from about 136 litres per day in 2000 to below 100 L per day
in 2012.
The Zaragoza case-study is best described as a transformation process in which different social
actors joined forces. Two features stand out for the process’s initiation: The adequate timing and the
special nature of the alliance between the two key actors. Around 1994, the municipality was in the
process of developing its Agenda 21 together with its long-term Municipal Strategic Plan, which ended
up featuring water as one of the key areas. At the same time, an NGO (ECODES) and Zaragoza
municipality started to work closely in opposition to the national plans to transfer water from the
Ebro river basin to the south of Spain. This collaboration was seen by interviewees as key to the city’s
subsequent transformation and was facilitated by existing personal relationship between the general
manager of the NGO and an influential civil servant. In their partnership, both actors benefited from
each other as they could resort to their different strengths. The NGO held more credibility with citizens
and were better at involving and engaging the broad public, whereas the municipality could provide
resources and capacity.
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The transformation process was initiated and maintained mainly through the four phases of
the Zaragoza Water Saving City Programme (1996–2008). Other actions promoted water savings,
including, (i) different municipal management plans and regulations (e.g., Municipal Strategic Plan
1996–2010, Agenda 21, “Plan for improving the water supply quality and management” 2002–2009);
(ii) active work to increase the city’s international profile in the field of urban water management
(e.g., hosting the UN Water for Life Decade 2005 to 2015 and the International Exhibition Water and
Sustainable Development in 2008); and (iii) demonstration and networking projects aiming inter alia
at establishing a market for Zaragoza’s experience and for its technology companies.
The Water Saving City Programme first targeted the domestic sector through media campaigns
(e.g., advertisements, radio, press, posters, etc.) and then expanded to other sectors. The outset was
favourable with the conflictive nature of national water transfers, meaning that the topic already had
prominence locally. Interviewees also highlighted how substantial efforts were made to keep actors
informed, not only of the different technologies and options, but also showing them the outcomes of
individual water saving actions. Concentrating efforts on e.g., hospitals and schools (e.g., stickers on
water saving technologies) and then showcasing the results to other actors was seen as key for uptake
of water saving appliances by other actors and the broad public. In addition, a simplified water tariff
established incentives for reducing water use. This was communicated in municipal services bills,
which distinguished between different items (water and waste), explained savings, and provided
examples of how to achieve further usage reduction.
The focus on high visibility and awareness through the Water Saving City Programme and the
many local stakeholder fora on environmental topics mostly created during the 1990s, such as the
Zaragoza Water Commission or the Consejo Sectorial de la Agenda 21 Local, was also of benefit for
implementing leakage control and reduction. A municipal authority mentioned how such action is
difficult to fund as this is an improvement that cannot be physically “seen” by citizens, and thus
provides no political advantages. All interviewees also described, in positive terms, the strategy used
to anchor the long term process in the municipality, but gaining political support for funding strategic
activities. This created technical ownership, ensuring the process was not interrupted by political
changes, as well as political ownership, helping to give impetus to the process in certain phases.
A further point is the continuous identification of opportunities to push the agenda and broaden
the uptake process. Linking the issue of water saving with other related topics was important.
For instance, one of the main drivers for the change in water tariffs was a legal action against the
old tariffs by the association of large families. For them, these did not fulfil equity criteria by unduly
punishing large families. Previous tariffs were also perceived as complicated, did not include incentives
for use reduction, and did not recover costs. Further justification was found by the municipality
through the implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive, which calls for the application of
cost-recovery, transparency, and equity. Other issue-linking included (i) the restoration of Ebro banks
and rivers, which were linked with the broader topic of environmental quality; (ii) the identification of
the whole initiative as a flagship initiative for the city; (iii) the generation of international attention
culminating in Expo Zaragoza and UN Water conferences; and (iv) more recently, capitalizing on
established networks to promote internationally Zaragoza’s water sector and experience.
Finally, research and pilot initiatives were used for both innovations. Technologies addressing
active leakage management were first tested for a neighbourhood before being upscaled to around
half the city. Ex-ante and ex-post research to set water tariffs was carried out by the University of
Zaragoza to determine, among other aspects, water price elasticity and average basic minimum
household demand. In 2009, Zaragoza’s local actors took advantage of European and national funding
for formalizing the collaboration between public bodies, the private sector, research institutions and
civil society through the ZINNAE platform. Its purpose is to further consolidate the city of Zaragoza
as a setting for knowledge and demonstration of the efficient use of water; using the city as a space for
testing innovations from local businesses.
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4. Discussion
The main observations from the three case studies are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Key results of each case study on each dimension of the governance assessment framework.
Governance Dimension Aarhus Case Emscher Case Zaragoza Case
Levels and scales -Municipality-Catchment scale















-Local coalition, NGO at the
centre




























-Active use of media
-WFD





















-Clear division of tasks








Note: Key findings are discussed according to the five governance dimensions in the following sections.
4.1. Levels and Scales
The cases of innovation uptake occurred mainly at the lowest possible level regarding the
nature of the problem faced. In the cases of Aarhus and Zaragoza, the focus was on the municipal
level. In the case of the Emscher, local councils were involved in the innovation uptake, but the
involvement of the water management association working at the level of the Emscher basin was
highly significant. The importance of the local level for innovation uptake in urban water management
is not surprising, since most responsibilities for the concrete operation and maintenance of water
infrastructures are also held at this level. Higher levels (e.g., national government and policies,
European institutions and policies) influenced the dynamics of innovation uptake not so much
by determining the agenda—this was based on the initiative of the local actors—but rather by
providing opportunities or additional support to local actors. For example, the uptake of the monitoring
technologies in Aarhus was embedded in, but not driven by, the implementation of the EU Bathing
Water Directive, while the water tariff reforms and promotion of water-efficiency in Zaragoza were
partly justified on the basis of WFD implementation. The Lake Phoenix project benefited from regional
priorities for regenerating the Emscher valley.
4.2. Actors and Networks
Innovation uptakes were advanced by small groups of actors which took entrepreneurial forms of
leadership. The role of key individuals in promoting innovation uptake is coherent with the literature
on societal transformation [11]. These actors provided a vision behind which other actors aligned over
time; they were more willing to take risks and were skilled in connecting policy proposals to problems
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and participants, and thereby build political momentum. For example, in Aarhus, the momentum was
initiated by the mayor candidate in his bid to get re-elected. It was then taken forward by a small
group of experts in the municipality, water utility and consulting firms. Such entrepreneurs can also
act as an intermediary or brokers.
Academic literature highlights the importance of building coalitions for promoting change.
Such coalitions may consist of the multiple beneficiaries of an innovation. For example, a clear
process of building a coalition for implementing Lake Phoenix took place through the linking of
multiple objectives (e.g., flood risk management, urban development, nature protection). In Zaragoza,
the objective of the initiative was not related to individual actors, but identified with the common good.
It was decided that the communication campaign be delivered by the NGO and not by the municipality,
as this helped to convey the message of an initiative beyond private and local government interests.
Although the academic literature often advocates strong public participation, and all case-studies
invested in the involvement of actors as well as the diffusion of information, the function of engagement
processes presented here is somewhat clouded. Whereas public participation helped to create and
sustain a common agenda between different actors in Zaragoza, both the Aarhus and the Emscher
projects were characterised by making limited use of public engagement at project level (at least
during the design phase), without this causing noticeable negative consequences for the successful
implementation of the projects themselves.
4.3. Goals and Ambitions
Political support provided key momentum in the three case-studies analysed. The clearest example
of how political support enabled the projects is in Aarhus, where a political candidate strongly
promoted the idea to regenerate the harbour area. Although the innovation had already been discussed
at the technical level beforehand, it was this capacity to gain broad attention for the topic which got
the initiative started. In the case of Lake Phoenix, political support was a necessary condition, as the
city of Dortmund was one of the key actors in its development. The case of Zaragoza is interesting in
that it shows the complex role of politics through the careful linking with politics by municipal actors.
In line with the work of [20] who suggests that it is beneficial to adapt your language and
highlight issues differently depending on the unique positions and preoccupations of the recipient
actors, this study shows that creating support depended on “framing” the benefits of the innovation in
a politically appealing way. In all case-studies, the idea of regenerating urban areas was an important
argument promoted in communication activities. The Emscher and Aarhus projects both increased the
attractiveness of neighbourhoods. The value of these initiatives for a city, in terms of city marketing or
city branding, was important to create political support.
Issue linking is a strategy often observed amongst entrepreneurs in the literature [11], and was also
observed in all analysed case-studies. In contrast to coalition building and framing, issue-linking entails
the linking of dimensions to a problem and the combination of two or more solutions. For example,
the possibility of linking the restoration of the Emscher river with flood protection requirements and
urban regeneration around a new lake was a strong rationale during scoping studies for the future of
a brownfield area, and was key for its economic viability. Searching for multiple benefits and the delivery
of several ecosystem services can help leverage and save money, as well as build supportive coalitions.
4.4. Strategies and Instruments
While regulations did not provide the key motivation for innovation uptake in any of the
case-studies, they were usually brought in by actors following particular interests as additional
supporting rationales. In Aarhus, the influencing regulation was the monitoring criteria of the EU
Bathing Water Directive, whereas, in the Emscher and Zaragoza, it was the ecological objectives
and cost recovery principles of the WFD, respectively. Softer forms of regulations, such as plans
(e.g., the Master Plan Emscher Future) and memorandums of understanding, were instrumental in all
case-studies to build overarching supporting policy frameworks and political awareness.
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The role of economic incentives presents a mixed track record in the analysed case-studies.
In Zaragoza, for example, municipality-organised market discounts of water saving appliances were
used to encourage uptake. Changes in domestic water pricing in Zaragoza and Aarhus did not
specifically aim to incentivise innovation uptake amongst users, but aimed to improve cost-recovery
of the water sector and support the financing of innovation uptake by the respective authorities.
Communication was seen as a key success factor by many interviewees: it helps building social
capital and legitimacy. In Zaragoza, the initial phases of the city’s transformation were based on
an extensive communication campaign which contributed to justifying increases in water tariffs and
further investments over the years. Local actors used every chance to communicate the issue of water
scarcity and the importance of water savings. In Aarhus, communication played an important role
during the initial electoral process and at the end of the construction period.
4.5. Resources and Responsibilities
In line with the views of various scholars [15,21] who suggest that the relational aspect greatly
matters in societal change trajectories, interviewees in all three case-studies stressed the importance of
close, long-established personal relations, and trust, even if the level of initial trust at the launch of the
projects varied substantially between the different actors and cases.
In all case-studies, actors gave significant thought to how to structure partnerships and allocate
roles. In the Emscher, implementation was managed by an independent project manager, and there was
a clear division of tasks, responsibilities and expertise within the entire project structure. This helped
manage suspicion that more influential actors would impose their interests on project design. In Aarhus,
roles were also established clearly, but using a partnering form of contract which meant that subsequent
role allocation was flexible. This was seen as positive because it enabled common ownership of the
project, and not simply a contractor/supplier relationship. Success can thus be related to the feeling
of some form of ownership on the innovation uptake, where partners are able to influence its design
and implementation.
Building knowledge on the development of the innovation and its implementation is recommended
in the literature on socio-technological systems transformation [3]. Evidence of all case-studies was
in line with this finding, as they all saw investment in innovation development. Zaragoza welcomed
a systematic use of knowledge production activities and use of pilot sites to test and showcase the
technologies. However, in-depth and extensive assessments, especially on the socio-economic impacts
of the innovation, were not carried out so systematically in other case-studies. For example, in Aarhus,
no stakeholder analysis and no cost-benefit analysis were carried out, perhaps because the initial
feasibility study showed its cost reduction potential compared to alternatives.
5. Conclusions
The research provides new empirical observations on the factors conducive to transformations
in urban water management at the local level. Our results suggest that a number of factors will play
a role in successful innovation uptake regardless of the technology or context, such as commitment
of stakeholders to compromise, the necessity to build political support, the role of small groups of
entrepreneurs and their discursive strategies (framing, issue linking), the structure of partnerships and
allocation of roles, and the impact of regulative, economic, financial and communicative instruments.
To conclude, a number of recommendations were developed to inspire actors with the potential
to become more entrepreneurial in promoting innovation uptake in urban water management.
These recommendations are aimed at innovators themselves and at regional water managers:
• Study the local actor agendas: identify those in favor of the innovation, and use their impetus and
lobbying capacity;
• Explore the potential of the innovation to serve other, non-related interests (co-benefits).
Linking with other societal challenges, dominating values or policy discourses is useful to broaden
access to funding or to increase the number of actors supporting the innovation;
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• Explore, in particular, the links of the innovation with the delivery of multiple ecosystem services
and societal benefits, such as city or regional branding and marketing, increasing quality of
life, recreational value or local real estate value. Incorporating these elements into the overall
implementation can improve the innovation’s affordability and feasibility;
• Give adequate consideration to the partnership structures to be put in place, in view of how they
balance the representation of different actors’ interests, and if they create common ownership of
the project;
• Create or maintain a collaborative spirit by fully considering demands of other organisations,
maintaining flexibility in design and implementation over time, and searching for compromises.
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